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BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE OR DUE DILIGENCE? HOW TO REDUCE
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SPAC DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

When market volatility is high, private companies seeking to go public
typically shy away from Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) because it is hard to
gauge whether investor interest will remain stable long enough for the IPO to
succeed. The market volatility of 2020, coupled with uncertainties about longterm valuations and PIPE1 capital availability, encouraged companies to pursue special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) transactions as an alternative to traditional IPOs. For instance, sports gaming company DraftKings
went public with a SPAC in April of 2020 in a $2.7 billion deal that allowed
investors to trade DraftKings’s stock on the Nasdaq.2 Just five months later,
in September of 2020, DraftKings’s share price had increased by over 250%.3
When asked about going public in 2020, DraftKings’s CEO Jason Robins
suggested if DraftKings “had been considering a traditional IPO, it’s possible
[the company] would have decided that [2020] wasn’t the right time.”4 While
2020 delivered many successful IPOs, including Airbnb and DoorDash,5
SPACs nevertheless outpaced traditional IPOs by volume in that year.6
SPACs are shell companies formed to take a private company public
through a merger transaction.7 They are created through a traditional IPO, the
proceeds of which are placed in a trust account until used to purchase an existing but unspecified company—the target company.8 SPACs typically have
1. Troy Segal, What Is a Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE)?, INVESTOPEDIA
(updated Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pipe.asp (explaining that a
“[p]rivate investment in public equity . . . is when an institutional or an accredited investor
buys stock directly from a public company below market price[,]” a strategy that saves “companies time and money” and helps them “raise funds more quickly”).
2. Matthew Waters, Draftkings Goes Public After Shareholder Approval, Business Combination, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/40250/draftkings-vote-going-public/.
3. Connor Smith, DraftKings Is Poised for ‘Hyper-Growth.’ Why Its Stock Could Be Like
Tesla, Amazon, and Netflix., BARRON’S (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/draftkings-stock-can-outperform-macquarie-analyst-says-51600967115.
4. Callum Borchers, DraftKings CEO Jason Robins On What It’s Like To Take a Company Public In a Pandemic, WBUR (updated Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2020/04/24/draftkings-public-ipo-jason-robins.
5. Andrew Willis, The 10 Biggest IPOs of 2020, MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1014850/the-10-biggest-ipos-of-2020.
6. Elliot Bentley, The SPAC Boom, Visualized, WALL ST. J. (updated Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-spac-boom-visualized-in-one-chart-11612962000.
7. E. RAMEY LAYNE ET AL., VINSON & ELKINS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION
COMPANIES: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (2020), https://docplayer.net/199944433-special-purpose-acquisition-companies-an-introduction-summer-2020.html.
8. Id.
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a deadline of about two years to acquire a target company and complete a
merger transaction.9 If the SPAC does not acquire a target within two years,
the SPAC dissolves, liquidates the trust fund, and returns the capital to the
SPAC’s original IPO investors.10
While SPACs allow many companies to quickly secure committed capital in unpredictable markets, they are not entirely new to the investment industry.11 Modern SPACs evolved from an investment vehicle known as
“blank check companies,” and the industry now uses the terms somewhat interchangeably.12 In the 1980s, blank check companies were the preferred investment vehicle for capitalizing on penny stock “pump-and-dump
schemes.”13 “Pump-and-dump” describes when an investor promotes (pumps)
a stock he holds (and often practically controls) to increase the share price and
then sells (dumps) his shares when the stock reaches an inflated price.14
The pump-and-dump schemes gave blank check companies a reputation
as an unsafe investment vehicle.15 As a result, Congress passed the Penny
Stock Reform Act of 199016 mandating enhanced requirements for blank
check companies by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).17 In the decade that followed, blank check companies significantly declined in popularity.18 By the late 1990s, the industry realized that smaller private companies
could go public by merging with a blank check company more affordably than
with a traditional IPO.19 Thus, today SPACs serve primarily as an IPO alternative.20

9. Id. at 14.
10. Id.
11. See Crystal Tse, Blank Check IPOs, the Status Symbol of 2020, Have Raised $32 Billion This Year, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202008-27/what-are-spacs-the-hottest-stocks-of-2020.
12. Tim Castelli, Not Guilty by Association: Why the Taint of Their “Blank Check” Predecessors Should Not Stunt the Growth of Modern Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, 50
BOSTON COLL. L. REV. 237, 238–39 (2009).
13. Id. at 239.
14. The Investopedia Team, How Does a Pump and Dump Scam Work?, INVESTOPEDIA
(updated Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/061205.asp.
15. See Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution
of SPACs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 875 (2013).
16. ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., 7 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD §
13:143 (2d ed. 2021).
17. Castelli, supra note 12, at 250.
18. Id. at 239.
19. Id. at 239–40.
20. E. RAMEY LAYNE ET AL., VINSON & ELKINS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION
COMPANIES: AN UPDATE 12 (2020), https://docplayer.net/191472628-special-purpose-acquisition-companies-an-update-summer-2020.html [hereinafter LAYNE ET AL., SPAC Update] (referring to the two footnotes at the bottom of the blog that differentiate between “blank check
companies” and SPACs) [hereinafter SPAC Update].

2021]

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

253

2020 was a record year for SPACs, with $77 billion raised in about 230
IPOs, a fivefold increase over the previous record year of 2019.21 Until recently, litigation involving SPACs occurred infrequently, but with the recent
market surge, pre-closing strike suits are proliferating, and the insurance costs
for SPACs directors and officers are skyrocketing.22 Post-closing litigation
brought after the merger with the target company has left plaintiffs and courts
somewhat confused about whether plaintiffs should bring claims under corporate fiduciary laws or the appropriate securities laws.23 This confusion
stems from the difficulty plaintiffs and courts have in defining and understanding the roles of SPAC directors and officers.24
This Note proposes limiting SPAC directors’ and officers’ corporate fiduciary duties to align with underwriters’ liability in a traditional IPO. Part II
distinguishes SPACs from traditional IPOs.25 Part III of the Note outlines Delaware’s corporate fiduciary duties laws and then explains why courts should
not apply those laws uniformly to SPAC directors and officers due to the lack
of accurate precedent.26 Part IV shows why plaintiffs should have brought
suits against SPACs under the applicable securities laws instead of for breach
of corporate fiduciary duty.27 Part V suggests proper perspectives and procedures to reduce SPAC directors’ liability to match IPO underwriters’ liability.28 Ultimately, this Note argues that because SPACs differ fundamentally
from traditional mergers, trying most SPAC cases under the appropriate securities laws—rather than under Delaware’s corporate fiduciary duty regime—will promote judicial economy and overall fairness.
II.

SPACS: HOW THEY DIFFER FROM IPOS AND WHY THAT MATTERS

With the origin of SPACs detailed above, this Part will now describe the
traditional IPO’s leading players and outline its basic deal structure. Then the
Note will similarly examine SPACs.

21. Stephen Amdur et al., The SPAC Explosion: Beware the Litigation and Enforcement
Risk, JD SUPRA (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-spac-explosion-beware-the-94550/.
22. Priya Cherian Huskins, Guide to D&O Insurance for SPAC IPOs (and How to Save
Money on Your D&O Insurance Premium), WOODRUFF SAWYER (Mar. 10, 2021), https://woodruffsawyer.com/do-notebook/insurance-coverage-spacs-2021/.
23. See infra Part IV (contrasting a case brought against the directors for breach of fiduciary duties against a case brought against directors for securities fraud).
24. See infra Part II.D.
25. Infra Part II.
26. Infra Part III.
27. Infra Part IV.
28. Infra Part V.
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Basic IPO Structure

IPOs are the traditional route to going public, and even though a SPAC
is considered an IPO alternative, IPOs are a significant step in the formation
of SPACs.29 The IPO process begins when a company seeking to go public
(issuer) begins working with an investment bank, also commonly referred to
as the underwriter.30 The underwriter starts gathering information from the
issuer to evaluate the company’s ideal IPO share price.31 To assemble the necessary financial data, the issuer relies upon a team of experts.32 This team
comprises the investment bank’s analysts, employees, third-party lawyers, accountants, and other advisors.33 The team helps the issuer prepare to meet the
reporting requirements of both the SEC and the stock exchange.34 Once the
issuer’s information has been reviewed and compiled, the team files its S-1
Registration Statement (S-1).35 The S-1 is an SEC filing that includes the issuer’s prospectus, which is the key document that investors rely upon to evaluate the company’s financial results, position, and prospects.36 Once the S-1
has been reviewed by the SEC and revised in response to SEC comments, the
underwriter and issuer begin a roadshow, which is the underwriter’s effort to
market the issuer’s securities to investors.37 Over some weeks, the underwriter
will proceed with the roadshow and gauge market demand for the issuer’s
securities.38 The team sets the IPO’s offering price by balancing its value and
estimating market demand from investors.39 At the end of the roadshow, the
underwriter will select an IPO issuance date to offer the securities to the public.40 Often, at the roadshow’s conclusion, underwriters make a firm commitment to purchase the shares of the issuing company and are liable on the IPO
issuance date to purchase all outstanding shares.41

29. See Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: SPAC and SPAN, or
Blank Check Redux?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 931, 951–52 (2007).
30. Jason Fernando, Initial Public Offering (IPO), INVESTOPEDIA (updated Mar. 1, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See Fernando, supra note 30.
37. Jason Gordon, Roadshow (IPO) - Explained, THE BUS. PROFESSOR (updated July 10,
2021), https://thebusinessprofessor.com/lesson/roadshow-ipo-definition/.
38. See Caleb Christensen, The Costs of Going Public, IPOHUB (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.ipohub.org/costs-going-public.
39. Fernando, supra note 30.
40. See id.
41. In re Am. Bank Note Holographics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F.Supp.2d 424, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (explaining how firm commitment underwriting works).
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Basic SPAC Structure

SPACs help a private company go public in a manner different from a
classic IPO. A SPAC is a shell company with no pre-existing operations, so
it does not require a devoted team of experts to organize its financial data
before going public.42 Instead, a third party known as a sponsor forms the
SPAC by registering it as a corporation, giving it a board of directors, providing the necessary startup capital, and completing the SPAC’s IPO.43 The sponsor forms the SPAC for the express purpose of taking public a currently unidentified company.44 The SPAC keeps the IPO proceeds in a trust account and
begins searching to purchase a target company within a specified period, typically two years or less.45 Most of the time, a SPAC acquires a privately held
target company.46 The resulting merger between the SPAC and the target
company allows the underlying private company to become publicly traded.47
The SPAC’s merger with the private company is referred to as the “de-SPAC
transaction.”48 Similar to how companies file an S-1 in an IPO, the SPAC will
file a proxy statement or a joint form S-4/prospectus during the de-SPAC
transaction that includes much of the same information as a traditional IPO
prospectus, effectively providing investors a level of disclosure equivalent to
traditional IPOs.49

42. See LAYNE ET AL., supra note 7, at 3.
43. Id. SPACs are typically incorporated as Delaware corporations but occasionally as
Cayman Corporations. See id. at 9. The initial capital the SPAC will use to purchase a target
company is raised in the SPAC’s IPO during “Phase 1” of the SPAC process. See infra note 50
and accompanying figure.
44. Id. at 2.
45. See SPAC Update, supra note 20, at 7.
46. LAYNE ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 17.
49. See id. at 16.
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Figure 1 - Three Phases of SPACs50

SPAC investors at the IPO phase—or in the aftermarket before the SPAC
identifies a target company (Target Search and Negotiation Phase)—invest in
the likelihood that the SPAC management will source a good deal.51 Effectively, the SPAC management team markets itself based on its network and
investment thesis.52 Investors are willing to invest because they think the team
will find a good deal, and the investor has downside protection through the
redemption rights and an equity kicker (in the form of warrants).53
A great example of this is the SPAC Pershing Square Tontine Holdings
run by Bill Ackman.54 It was the largest SPAC of 2020, raising over $4 billion
at the SPAC IPO.55 The investors were betting on Ackman’s ability to acquire

50. Ramey Layne & Brenda Lenahan, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: An Introduction, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 6, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/06/special-purpose-acquisition-companies-an-introduction/.
51. See Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 15, at 871.
52. See id.
53. LAYNE ET AL., supra note 7, at 2, 8.
54. SPAC Update, supra note 20, at 5 (outlining the deal structure of Ackman’s SPAC,
Pershing Square Tontine Holdings).
55. Id. (explaining that Pershing Square Tontine Holdings is considerably larger than existing SPACs).
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a valuable target company successfully.56 If Ackman could not find a good
deal or close a merger on time, the investors carried the enhanced protection
afforded by the SPAC’s redemption rights and warrants.57
C.

Why SPACs Outperformed IPOs in 2020

Several factors that differentiate SPACs from the traditional IPO drive
their growing appeal. As a whole, SPAC advantages offer private companies
a lower barrier to entry to the public capital markets.58 SPACs provide a lower
barrier to entry because they are practically always more affordable to the
private company on the front end than IPOs.59 SPACs are also attractive to
private companies because those companies receive a valuation from the
SPAC in a private negotiation based on a multi-year forecast, instead of having their financials marched around and marketed to potential investors in a
traditional IPO roadshow.60 Additionally, private companies that use a SPAC
can secure committed PIPE capital much more quickly, generally within 4–6
weeks (versus 4–6 months to obtain committed capital in a traditional IPO).61
Also, SPACs are attractive because they have several measures in place
to protect investor capital.62 SPACs have better investor protection because
they have retained many safeguards against fraud instituted by the Penny
Stock Reform Act (PRSA).63 While SPACs are not technically required to
utilize the safeguards of the PRSA, they have kept them in place to provide
increased investor security.64 SPACs voluntarily adhere to most of the requirements of SEC Rule 419; IPO proceeds are held in a trust account and
disbursed for only certain purposes, i.e., to redeem outstanding shares or to
complete the purchase of the SPAC’s target company.65
The two most prominent safeguards of SPACs outside of the trust account regulations are: (1) the investor’s ability to vote via a proxy statement
56. Reuters Staff, Breakingviews - Capital Calls: Bill Ackman’s SPAC Surges, REUTERS
(Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-finance-breakingviews/breakingviews-capital-calls-bill-ackmans-spac-surges-idUSKBN2AI283.
57. See LAYNE ET AL., supra note 7, at 2–8.
58. See David M. Smith et al., Reverse Mergers and Nanotechnology, 4
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 87, 93 (2007).
59. See Castelli, supra note 12, at 239–40.
60. See Fernando, supra note 30 (explaining the roadshow process); see also Castelli, supra note 12, at 257–58 (explaining that a private company can use a SPAC to avoid the uncertainty of how the “public will react to its offering”).
61. See SPAC Update, supra note 20, at 7 (discussing the availability of PIPE capital for
SPAC transactions).
62. See generally Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 15, at 890–920.
63. Castelli, supra note 12, at 248–51.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 254–57; see also LAYNE ET AL., supra note 7, at 5.
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on the proposed business combination and (2) the investor’s ability to redeem
the purchased shares before an acquisition.66 The first of these safeguards allows investors to vote either for or against the target company’s acquisition.67
The second enables investors to redeem shares at a pro rata price before the
de-SPAC transaction if they consider the capital better utilized elsewhere. 68
These protections favor investors much more than those of a traditional
IPO.69 For example, compared to the SPAC investor’s ability to redeem shares
before the de-SPAC transaction, traditional IPO underwriters or investors that
make a firm purchase commitment before the IPO date do not have an option
to withdraw from the deal before the IPO.70 In a de-SPAC, the investor can
make the redemption decision after watching how the transaction trades on
the market and knowing how the public views the deal.71 In contrast, in a traditional IPO, the investor will not see how the market likes the deal until the
launch.72
Lastly, a SPAC’s board of directors is bound by corporate fiduciary duties to the shareholders before the de-SPAC transaction.73 In contrast, the underwriters and issuers in an IPO are not necessarily bound by corporate fiduciary duties to the investors that purchase shares in an IPO. 74 Since investors
that make purchases in an IPO are dealing with the underwriters via contract,
if the underwriters or issuers were to mislead the investors, their only grounds
for legal action after the IPO would likely be based on the statutory provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act.75 However, for SPACs, the investors that own
the SPAC’s shares on the record date for the de-SPAC vote could sue the
directors and officers for breach of corporate fiduciary duty or statutory liability under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.76

66. Castelli, supra note 12, at 271.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 270–71.
70. Patrick M. Corrigan, The Seller’s Curse and the Underwriter’s Pricing Pivot: A Behavioral Theory of IPO Pricing, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 335, 347–48 (2019).
71. Borchers, supra note 4 (discussing how the CEO of DraftKings was able to watch
shares trade and gauge how the public liked the idea of DraftKings going public).
72. See Michael J. Dillon, SPAC Directors Cannot Take the Protection of the Business
Judgment Rule for Granted, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=71b5afb1-8eee-487f-b7bb-11ef55191573.
73. See infra Part IV.A.
74. See Corrigan, supra note 70, at 365, 409–10.
75. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 788 (2d Cir. 1951); see also 111
A.L.R. Fed. 83 (1993).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.; 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.; see also infra note 122 (citing specific
portions of the Acts that deal with securities fraud).
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Why SPAC Directors Are Like IPO Underwriters

As shown above, the SPAC structure often allows SPACs to outperform
IPOs by getting private companies to market more quickly and better protecting investor capital.77 However, because the end goal for both SPACs and
IPOs is to take a company public, the roles of the key players in SPACs and
IPOs are analogous. For instance, a SPAC works with a team to gather the
target company’s financial data and then markets its shares, as an underwriter
would do for the issuing company in an IPO.78 The SPAC directors and officers then relay the target company’s information to the SPAC’s shareholders
via a proxy statement so shareholders can determine whether to remain in the
deal.79 This step of the SPAC process is analogous to IPO underwriters’ marketing the issuing company’s shares to investors during the roadshow.80 Additionally, the target company in a SPAC is like the issuer in a traditional IPO
because the target company can go public in a de-SPAC transaction just as an
issuer can go public with a traditional IPO.81 In other words, the target company in a SPAC and the issuer in an IPO often share the same end goal of
becoming traded publicly and accessing as much capital as possible.82
Grasping the above analogy is critical to understanding why corporate
fiduciary duties should be amended (or the SPAC structure revised) to make
the SPAC directors’ liability match that of IPO underwriters. Clarifying any
distinction between underwriters’ liabilities versus SPAC directors’ and officers’ liabilities is essential since the two play very similar roles in taking
private companies public.83 The key difference is that SPAC directors owe
fiduciary duties to the SPAC’s shareholders before and after the de-SPAC
transaction. In contrast, the IPOs’ underwriters owe no fiduciary duties to the
purchasers of their IPO shares at any time.84 Underwriters do not have a fiduciary duty because they rely upon the information provided to them by the
private company seeking to go public when they promote the private

77. See supra Part II.C.
78. See supra Part II.A and accompanying text.
79. Riemer, supra note 29, at 952.
80. See supra Part II.A (discussing that the underwriters pitch the securities of the issuing
company to institutional investors on a roadshow).
81. See supra Part II (stating that IPOs go public on the offering date and that SPACs go
public in a de-SPAC transaction).
82. See supra Part II.
83. See Riemer, supra note 29, at 952; Richard Harroch et al., 10 Key Questions And
Answers About SPACs, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2020/11/11/10-key-questions-and-answers-about-spacs/?sh=4203914b2f83 (stating that
“the SPAC will do extensive due diligence on the target company, similar to due diligence in
M&A or IPO transactions”).
84. See supra Part II.C.
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company’s stock.85 Suppose the issuing company provides underwriters with
false information the underwriters could not verify through reasonable care.
In that case, the law does not hold underwriters liable for the issuing company’s misrepresentation when making securities based on statements that the
underwriters reasonably believed to be accurate.86 Hence, IPO underwriters
are afforded the protection of the “due diligence defense” under Section 11(b)
of the Securities Act, which absolves them of liability for misstatements made
in registration statements if “after reasonable investigation” they believed the
statements to be true at the time of filing.87
Likewise, SPAC directors rely upon the target company to provide accurate financial reports and data to make an informed business acquisition.88
Assuming a SPAC’s directors and officers have exercised reasonable due diligence, any negligence or fraudulent misrepresentation will likely be the target company’s fault.89
Therefore, because SPAC directors are similarly situated to the underwriters in a traditional IPO, it is equitable for SPAC directors’ and officers’
liability to match that of IPO underwriters. Namely, SPAC directors should
enjoy the due diligence defense afforded to IPO underwriters, to protect them
from litigation after the de-SPAC transaction. Additionally, corporate fiduciary duties in a merger context spring from the fact that directors have higher
duties because they are acting on behalf of all shareholders, and the majority
can bind minority holders.90 However, in a de-SPAC, every public holder has
the right to opt out via redemption, so even if a majority decision binds, minority shareholders retain an exit option.91
The immediate solution is to change the SPAC structure to mitigate liability for breach of SPAC directors’ and officers’ corporate fiduciary duties,
to reflect that SPAC directors’ and officers’ motives differ fundamentally
from those of directors and officers in traditional mergers. It is also imperative
that courts understand that the fundamental differences of SPACs, as compared to traditional mergers, ensure that the majority cannot force minority
shareholders into the merger.

85. See Corrigan, supra note 70, at 345–48.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b).
87. Id.; In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
88. See Riemer, supra note 29, at 952.
89. See generally AP Servs., LLP v. Lobell, No. 651613/12, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 19, 2015).
90. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2009).
91. See Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 15, at 914.
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III.

DELAWARE: CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES, THE RELEVANT
STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND WHY THEY SHOULD NOT APPLY TO SPACS
Because most SPACs are Delaware Corporations, Part III.A of this Note
will focus on the relevant Delaware laws governing corporate fiduciary duties
and why they should not apply uniformly to SPACs.92 Part III.B will address
potential inherent conflicts of SPAC directors and officers. Part III.C will explain why the business judgment rule should apply when plaintiffs sue SPACs
for breach of fiduciary duty.
A.

Delaware’s Laws Governing Corporate Fiduciary Duties

Delaware imposes the duties of care and loyalty upon the directors and
officers of its corporations.93 First, the duty of care requires directors to avoid
gross negligence when making business decisions.94 A director breaches his
duty of care to the corporation and its stockholders when he fails to act with
the level of care attributable to an ordinarily careful and prudent person in a
similar circumstance.95
When a plaintiff asserts that a director has breached his duty of care or
duty of loyalty, the court applies the business judgment standard of review.96
The business judgment standard of review is the general assumption that the
directors of the corporation have exercised judgment “on an informed basis,
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.”97 A plaintiff seeking to rebut the business judgment
standard of review by showing a breach of the duty of care is required to show
that the directors were grossly negligent by ignoring red flags or failing to use
all the information available to them in making a business decision.98
The duty of loyalty requires the directors to act in good faith, to act in
the best interest of both the corporation and its shareholders, and to refrain

92. See SPAC Update, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that many SPACs are domiciled in the
Cayman Islands).
93. See 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI ET AL., DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 4.19 (John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Blake Rohrbacher eds., 4th ed. 2020 &
Supp. 2021).
94. RONALD J. COLOMBO, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS & DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES,
& LIABILITIES § 2:5 (2020–2021 ed. 2020).
95. Id.; Thomas A. Uebler, Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders’ Ability to Hold Directors Accountable for Intentional Violations of Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 208 (2008)
(“[A] court will only conclude that a director has breached his duty of care based on the substance of his decision if no rational person would make the decision under the circumstances.”).
96. COLOMBO, supra note 94, at § 2:16.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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from any act of self-dealing.99 Breach of the duty of loyalty most often occurs
when directors have conflicts of interest or additional conflicting corporate
opportunities.100 When a director has breached his duty of loyalty, the court
applies the entire fairness standard of review.101 The entire fairness standard
of review is a higher level of scrutiny than the business judgment rule and
requires the court to determine whether the transaction was fair and the product of fair dealing.102 While plaintiffs bear the burden of proof under the business judgment rule, directors bear the burden of proof under the entire fairness
standard of review.103
Directors wishing to avoid carrying the burden of proof under the entire
fairness standard of review can “cure” the transaction by (1) having the transaction approved by a majority of the minority shareholders or (2) having the
transaction approved by a majority of the disinterested directors.104 If the directors cure the transaction with one of these two procedural safeguards, then
the burden will shift back to the plaintiff to show that the transaction was
unfair.105
Section B will show that the duty of loyalty is of more immediate concern to SPAC directors because the directors have potential inherent conflicts
requiring the court to apply the entire fairness standard of review. Section C
will address the duty of care and how it should be amended for SPAC directors.
B.

Inherent Conflicts of SPAC Directors: Why the Procedural Safeguards
Are Redundant

The board of directors of a SPAC is more susceptible to liability for
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty because of the inherent potential for
conflicts of interest that arise due to the SPAC’s compensation structure.106
The directors are not compensated unless the SPAC merges with the target
company.107 If the merger fails or does not occur at all, the directors are not
compensated for the two or more years of work they have performed.108 This
compensation structure coupled with the deadlines required to complete the
99. Id. § 3:1.
100. Id. § 3:5.
101. Id. § 3:23.
102. COLOMBO, supra note 94, at § 3:23.
103. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) (stating that the
directors must demonstrate value of the price offered, not the plaintiffs).
104. See Mary A. Jacobson, Interested Director Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects
of Shareholder Ratification, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 989 (1996).
105. Id. at 1009.
106. Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 15, at 904.
107. Id. at 904–05.
108. See id.
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merger can arguably motivate the directors to push for the deal to go through
before the SPAC’s charter expires.109 Depending on the court’s view of the
materiality of the compensation, the compensation structure can make the directors’ interests differ from the public’s interest and, therefore, subject to the
entire fairness standard of review.110 While conflicts of interest can arise with
almost any merger transaction, SPACs have instituted strong procedural safeguards to mitigate the inherent conflicts of interest of the SPAC fiduciaries.111
The procedural safeguard most SPACs utilize to protect investors is approval by the majority of shareholders.112 Because SPACs hold most of the
capital raised at the SPAC IPO in a trust account (often over 95%), the capital
is well protected and at low risk of loss before the de-SPAC transaction.113
Additionally, SPACs often make a tender offer to purchase the shares of investors that wish to exit before the de-SPAC transaction.114 These tender offers are often financed by PIPE capital, allowing de-SPAC transactions to
close in a timely fashion.115 When the de-SPAC transaction is not approved,
or the SPAC lacks sufficient capital to close the deal, the trust account is liquidated and distributed to the shareholders.116
Shareholders will often have standing to sue if the transaction did not
perform according to their expectations.117 They could bring suit based on a
breach of corporate fiduciary duty, alleging that the directors had conflicts of
interest, with the case potentially subject to review under the entire fairness
standard.118 The overt problem with this is that the only way SPAC directors
could conceivably breach their duty to shareholders would be by misleading
shareholders with misinformation about the target company.119 And the only
way directors could provide such misinformation would be by negligently
failing to complete due diligence, relying on misinformation supplied by the
target company, or fraudulently misleading the shareholders through

109. See id. at 899.
110. See supra Part III.A.
111. See Iman Anabtawi, The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A Jurisprudence, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 171 (2019) (explaining that Delaware has begun to allow procedural safeguards to bring directors’ decisions from enhanced scrutiny down to the business
judgment standard of review); e.g., Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 15, at 910–12.
112. Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 15, at 910–12.
113. Id. at 914–15.
114. Id. at 912.
115. LAYNE ET AL., supra note 7, at 3.
116. Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 15, at 914.
117. Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 353 (Del. 1988) (explaining that shareholders can bring a derivative cause of action for director mismanagement).
118. See supra notes 101–05.
119. See supra Part II.D.
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intentional misrepresentation of the target company’s information.120 The Securities Exchange Act has provisions that allow shareholders to recover in
each scenario; therefore, it would be redundant to hold directors liable for
breach of fiduciary duty.121 Furthermore, as interpreted in most case law, corporate fiduciary duties do not adequately function when applied to shell companies like SPACs because most caselaw involves traditional mergers between two operating companies.122
Part III.C. will show why the business judgment rule should apply when
reviewing SPAC directors’ and officers’ decisions in most cases of material
misrepresentation. Additionally, it will show that even when SPAC directors
and officers mislead their investors, the investors’ best remedy will likely be
under the Securities Exchange Act.
C.

Business Judgment Rule: Why it Should Apply Instead of the Entire
Fairness Standard of Review

As mentioned in Part III.A, the business judgment rule is the court’s presumption that the directors have acted in the shareholders’ best interest, and
its purpose is to mitigate liability for directors and officers of corporations.123
The most accessible argument that a frustrated investor can put forward
under Delaware laws of corporate fiduciary duty is that the directors and officers have inherent conflicts of interest and have violated their duty of loyalty.124 Regarding this primary argument, the fact that the directors and officers have interests that differ from the public’s should not equate to a breach
of the duty of loyalty, for two reasons. First, the shareholders entered the
transaction understanding that the SPAC’s purpose is to acquire a target company within a specified period.125 Second, the shareholders entered the deal
knowing that the SPAC’s directors are not compensated if a target is not acquired.126
Because shareholders voluntarily invest in SPACs with full knowledge
of the SPAC’s purpose to acquire a target company and of how the SPAC
120. See supra Part II.D (explaining how the roles of SPAC directors and officers are analogous to the roles of IPO underwriters, in that both must perform due diligence in determining
the value of the target company or issuing company respectively).
121. See infra Part IV.B (starting at note 198 regarding the applicable provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts).
122. See generally Christopher Kercher et al., Litigation Risk in the SPAC World, (Oct. 1,
2020), JD SUPRA, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/litigation-risk-in-the-spac-world88058/#_ftnref11 (stating that “the SEC recently announced that it will be carefully scrutinizing SPACs” and then analyzing the likely types of litigation that will surround SPACs).
123. See supra Part III.A.
124. See supra Part III.B.
125. See supra Part III.B.
126. See supra Part III.B.
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directors are compensated, courts should assume that the shareholders’ interests align with the directors’ and officers’ interests. Additionally, the majority
cannot force the minority shareholders into the de-SPAC transaction because,
aside from the proxy vote, minority shareholders can exercise rights to redeem
their shares voluntarily.127 Therefore, SPAC directors should be liable only
for negligently or intentionally committing securities fraud. If the shareholders need to sue for either reason, they have the means to do so under the appropriate securities laws.128
The second argument shareholders might bring is that the directors and
officers have breached their duty of care by being grossly negligent in reviewing the target company, ignoring red flags, or providing the shareholders with
materially false information in the proxy filings.129 Regarding this argument,
a court will need to determine whether the directors and officers have applied
the level of care attributable to an ordinarily careful and prudent person in a
similar circumstance.130 When analyzing the directors’ judgment, the judiciary should recall that the directors and officers of SPACs are more similarly
situated to the underwriters of an IPO than to directors and officers of traditional mergers.131 SPAC directors are more like IPO underwriters because
they rely on the target company’s information (verified to the extent reasonably possible by the directors and the SPAC’s advisors) to make a purchase
decision just as underwriters rely on the information of an issuing company.132
Therefore, directors and officers of a SPAC often do not have firsthand
knowledge of the target company’s operations. This lack of knowledge means
that the target company could mislead SPAC directors and officers with inaccurate financial reports. False or misleading reports, unverifiable through reasonable due diligence, would, in turn, cause the SPAC directors and officers
to mislead the SPAC’s shareholders.133 Considering that directors and officers
lack inside knowledge of the target company, a court should revert to the business judgment rule for challenges to the breach of the duty of care absent a
showing that the SPAC’s directors and officers misled the SPAC shareholders
either fraudulently or by gross negligence.
Because the directors and officers of SPACs primarily rely on the target
company’s reported information, they need a defense like the due diligence
127. See supra Part III.B.
128. See infra Part IV.C.
129. See AP Servs., LLP v. Lobell, No. 651613/12, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314, at *23–
24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 19, 2015) (explaining that the plaintiff’s first cause of action included
breach of the duty of care for failing to heed “red flags”).
130. See supra Part III.A.
131. See supra Part II.D.
132. See supra Part II.D.
133. See supra Part II.D (explaining that directors and officers of SPACs do not have unrestricted access to the target company’s information, making them susceptible to being misled
by information that appears facially accurate).
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defense afforded to IPO underwriters, in two circumstances. The first is when
plaintiffs sue after the de-SPAC transaction for breach of the fiduciary duties
of care and loyalty. The second is when plaintiffs sue for securities fraud.
Part IV will review two lawsuits against SPACs, one for breach of fiduciary duties and the other for securities fraud.
IV.

CASE STUDY: CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES ECLIPSED BY
SECURITIES LAWS AS REMEDY FOR HOLDING SPAC DIRECTORS LIABLE
FOR SECURITIES MANIPULATION
Shareholders dissatisfied with the outcome of the de-SPAC transaction
can pursue the SPAC directors and officers for a claim of breach of corporate
fiduciary duties or a claim of securities fraud under the Securities Exchange
Act.134 Part IV.A discusses the importance of a New York Superior Court case
where creditors brought a breach of corporate fiduciary duties claim and the
court held that the plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to successfully rebut the
business judgment standard of review. Part IV.B examines a case from the
Southern District of New York brought by the SEC for securities fraud, to
show how securities laws more appropriately address most issues that will
arise from fraudulent or grossly negligent behavior on the part of SPAC directors and officers.
A.

Case 1: AP Servs., LLP v. Lobell – Shareholders Sue for Breach of
Fiduciary Duties

One of the more recent lawsuits involving a SPAC and the business judgment rule is AP Servs., LLP v. Lobell.135 This opinion is the New York Superior Court’s ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.136 In this case, the plaintiff, AP Services LLP (“AP Services”), brought
an action for breach of the fiduciary duty of care and the duty of loyalty
against the directors of the SPAC, Paramount Acquisition Corp (“Paramount”).137 AP Services alleged that the directors of the SPAC had a conflict
of interest stemming from the compensation structure of the SPAC.138 AP Services explained that Paramount’s directors would not receive compensation
if a target company was not acquired by October 2007.139 In January of 2007,
the merger that Paramount’s directors had in the works fell through, leaving
134. See supra Part II.C.
135. AP Servs., LLP v. Lobell, No. 651613/12, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 19, 2015).
136. Id. at *1–2.
137. Id. at *1.
138. See id.
139. Id. at *3–4.
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just under ten months for them to complete a merger.140 AP Services alleged
that Paramount’s directors then “‘began frantically searching for a new merger target.’”141 Paramount’s directors signed over twenty new non-disclosures
with potential targets in their search for the new merger and eventually settled
on Chem Rx.142 Paramount’s directors signed a merger agreement with Chem
Rx after achieving board approval in a two-hour meeting.143 Paramount then
managed to get 80% shareholder approval after making concessions to the
larger shareholders, namely $30 million in put options.144
Once the shareholders approved the deal, AP Services alleged that Paramount’s directors ignored red flags in “an intentional dereliction of their fiduciary duties” to the corporation’s shareholders.145 AP Services stated that
the red flags were the “untrustworthy and incomplete” financial statements of
the target company, an exorbitant $4.63 million “advisory fee” paid to Chem
Rx’s original auditor, a pre-LBO payment to one of Chem Rx’s largest suppliers, and the $30 million in put options afforded the largest shareholders.146
In ignoring the red flags, AP Services alleged that Paramount’s directors
caused Chem Rx to become “saddled” with “massive debt” that caused the
company to go bankrupt in 2010.147 AP Services brought the action on behalf
of Chem Rx’s litigation trust as mandated by the bankruptcy court.148
The court determined that the plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts that,
taken as true, would successfully rebut the business judgment rule.149 The
court then explained within the footnotes that it might have held differently
concerning the standard of review if the parties had cited legal authority to
specifically address the interests of SPAC directors, or if the defendants had
cited legal authority to establish a defense.150 Faced with legal authority supporting either contingency, the court would have stood willing to reverse its
opinion that the plaintiffs had rebutted the business judgment standard of review at this stage of the proceedings.151
There are four key points to highlight from this case. First, the alleged
negligence is that the SPAC’s directors and officers overlooked the target
company’s inflated financials.152 Second, the court held that the plaintiffs pled
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Lobell, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314, at *4 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *10–11.
Id. at *10 (internal quotations omitted), *22–33.
Lobell, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314, at *1, *9.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *18–20.
See id.
See id. at *1.
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sufficient facts to show the directors and officers to have conflicts of interest
stemming from the SPAC’s compensation structure.153 Third, the conflicts of
interest, taken as true, meant that the lower court should consider whether the
entire fairness standard applied.154 And fourth, the court would likely have
ruled differently had the defendants cited legal authority for some type of curing defense.155
1.

The “Red Flags” Were the Immediate Responsibility of the Target
Company’s Directors and Officers

Among the red flags plaintiffs cited were ‘untrustworthy and incomplete’ financial statements.156 But these ‘untrustworthy and incomplete’ financial statements belonged to the target company, not to the SPAC.157 Therefore,
the target company should be held directly liable for its misleading financial
statements that the SPAC directors and officers reported in the Proxy Statement and Stock Purchase Agreement.158 Interestingly, in an attempt to protect
itself from this exact scenario, the SPAC included an exculpatory clause in its
articles of incorporation to preclude its shareholders from suing for breach of
fiduciary duty.159 The court determined the SPAC had exculpated itself from
litigation for breach of the duty of care for ordinary negligence, but not for
gross negligence.160 For this reason, the court focused on determining whether
the directors and officers of the SPAC had failed to exercise proper oversight
by ignoring red flags in a grossly negligent manner.161
The Court’s analysis in Lobell illustrates that target companies should in
some way be held liable for providing misleading statements. It also indicates
that SPACs can exculpate themselves from liability for breach of the duty of
care. However, it is not wrong to hold SPAC directors and officers liable when
they have committed gross negligence in ignoring prominent red flags.162
153. Lobell, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314, at *18.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *19–20.
156. Id. at *10 (internal quotations omitted).
157. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
158. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that directors of target companies should be held liable
for securities fraud).
159. Lobell, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314, at *24. Exculpatory clauses of this nature prevent recovery by plaintiffs suing for breach of fiduciary duty unless the director has breached
his duty of loyalty, acted in bad faith, or for various other enumerated exceptions as explained
in Delaware law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020).
160. Lobell, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314, at *24–25 (explaining how the directors cannot
be held liable for simple negligence due to their having included an exculpatory clause in the
articles of incorporation).
161. Id. at *25.
162. See id. at *26–27.
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Therefore, the only way the SPAC directors could have been held liable for
breach of the duty of care in ignoring the red flags was for the plaintiffs to
establish that the SPAC directors did so either intentionally or with gross negligence.163 Assuming the court finds a SPAC’s directors have ignored the red
flags and included the “untrustworthy and incomplete” financial statements
in a grossly negligent manner, the directors’ conduct would be a breach of the
duty of care.164 However, their conduct would be more accurately described
as securities fraud under both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act.165
Because a court could hold SPAC directors liable for securities fraud for
filing proxy statements in an intentionally fraudulent or grossly negligent
manner, holding them accountable for a breach of the duty of care in the same
scenario is redundant. Additionally, the SEC is better equipped to decide
whether securities fraud exists, as implicated by (1) the SEC’s mission statement166 and (2) the existence of the business judgment rule.167 For these reasons, courts should hold SPAC directors and officers responsible for securities fraud under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 rather than the laws of corporate fiduciary duties.
2.

The Potential Inherent Conflicts of Interest Should not Immediately
Invoke the Entire Fairness Standard of Review for SPACs

The Lobell court held that the plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to show
that the SPAC’s directors and officers had inherent conflicts of interest.168 In
holding that inherent conflicts were likely present, the court relied primarily
upon two factors presented in the plaintiff’s brief. First, the court relied upon
an unpublished Delaware opinion that briefly mentioned the potential inherent conflicts created by SPAC compensations structures.169 Second, the court
relied upon the SPAC’s Proxy Statement, which also acknowledged that directors and officers might face conflicts due to compensation structure.170 As
noted above, the court expressed its willingness to reinstate the business judgment standard of review if the defendants had cited some legal authority that

163. See id. at *25–27.
164. Id. at *10, *35–36.
165. See Kercher et al., supra note 122 (“Shareholders disappointed by the post-SPAC
company’s performance may claim SPAC managers’ statements or written proxy statements
are misleading or fraudulent and may challenge them under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act,
and under Sections 10(b) and 20(a), and Securities Act Section 17(a) as well.”).
166. About the SEC, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (“The mission of the SEC is to protect investors . . . .”).
167. See supra Part III.A.
168. See Lobell, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314, at *18.
169. See id. at *19.
170. See id. at *4, *19.
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specifically addressed SPAC directors’ interests, or some legal authority to
establish an applicable defense.171
The Lobell court acknowledged that there was little support for its ruling
that the plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to show that the directors and officers of the SPAC had inherent conflicts of interest.172 The Lobell court found
the lower court’s citation of an unpublished case to be weak, because the
lower court cited a party’s argument rather than an established holding.173 The
lower court’s holding does not mention any conclusion on potential conflicts
of the SPAC directors and officers.174 Because the Lobell court relied on the
petitioner’s argument in an unpublished Delaware case as persuasive authority for holding that SPAC directors are inherently conflicted, courts should
disregard this specific point of reasoning in the Lobell opinion.175
Second, the court in Lobell relied on statements in the SPAC’s filings
that acknowledged the directors and officers might face conflicts due to the
SPAC’s compensation structure.176 Found in the Proxy filing, the first statement mentions that the directors may “have interests in the Transaction that
may be different from [the shareholders]” due to the directors’ compensation
method.177 The second statement in the Registration Statement explains that
the directors may have “a potential conflict of interest” because of the possible
loss of the directors’ investment.178 Other SPACs, including DraftKings, provide similar statements to reduce liability for non-disclosure of potential risks
mandated by the bespeaks caution doctrine.179
Since proxy statements explain directors’ and officers’ interests in the
transaction, shareholders enter the deal knowing how the directors and officers are to be compensated and that the deal must close within a specified period.180 Additionally, if shareholders wish to exit the deal, they can redeem
their shares before the de-SPAC transaction.181
171. See id. at *18–20.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Opportunity Partners, L.P. v. TransTech Serv. Partners, Inc., No. 4340-VCP, 2009
WL 997334, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2009) (holding that the SPAC should hold an annual
meeting before a specified date, and omitting any positive determination that the underlying
structure of SPACs is positive identification of inherent conflicts of interest).
175. Lobell, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314, at *18–20.
176. Id. at *16–18.
177. Id. at *17 (internal quotations omitted).
178. Id. (referring to the loss of compensation if the directors are unable to complete a deSPAC transaction).
179. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 12:57 (2d ed. 2021); Diamond Eagle Acquisition Corp., Proxy Statement
(Schedule 14A) 77–78 (Apr. 15, 2020) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1772-757/
000110465920046722/tv539133-defm14a.htm#TOC.
180. See Diamond Eagle Acquisition Corp., supra note 179, at 77–78.
181. LAYNE ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.
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Because shareholders know the SPAC’s compensation structure on the
front end and that its purpose is to acquire a target within a specified time,
this Note argues that courts should consider the interests of shareholders and
SPAC directors and officers to be aligned. Additionally, the SPAC’s directors
and officers owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders and the corporation.182
Delaware’s laws reflect this principle, repeatedly “refer[ring] to directors owing fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.”183 Because the
directors also owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, whose sole purpose is
to acquire a target company within a specified period, the directors should not
be held liable for breach of fiduciary duties for striving to accomplish the
SPAC’s fundamental purpose. This argument does not posit that SPAC directors and officers should not be held liable for fraud or gross negligence. But
as pointed out above, the most likely type of fraud or gross negligence in a
SPAC will be securities fraud because the SPAC is a shell company with no
operations,184 and its goal is to take a private company public.
In the absence of a conclusive opinion from the Delaware Supreme Court
explicitly addressing the business judgment rule’s application to SPACs, a
court should note five factors when deciding what standard of review to apply.
First, the court should note that SPAC directors must complete an acquisition
within a short period. Second, the court should acknowledge that the shareholders entered the deal knowing how SPACs compensate their directors and
officers. Third, the court should appreciate the directors’ and officers’ upfront disclosure of possible conflicts of interest, pursuant to the bespeaks caution doctrine. Fourth, the court should understand that SPAC directors and
officers are analogous to underwriters in a traditional IPO; therefore, any
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will likely involve securities
fraud. Lastly, the court should appreciate that it is not the SPAC’s information
in the proxy and registration statements that is most susceptible to material
misrepresentation, but rather the target company’s information.
For these reasons, a court analyzing an action for breach of the duty of
loyalty against SPAC directors and officers should not immediately apply the
entire fairness standard of review. Additionally, a court should note that plaintiff’s lawyers should bring any action to recover for securities fraud under the
Securities Exchange Act’s appropriate measures, to enhance judicial economy and overall fairness.

182. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (establishing that
the directors and officers also owe a duty to the corporation, as indicated by the formulation of
Delaware’s laws of corporate fiduciary duties).
183. Id. at 36 (internal quotations omitted).
184. LAYNE ET AL., supra note 7, at 25.
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Case 2: Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hurgin – SEC Sues for Securities
Fraud

In Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hurgin, the SEC brought an action against a
company that went public through a SPAC.185 The SEC brought an action for
securities fraud and violation of proxy solicitation rules against Ability Inc.
(the merged company), its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and its Chief
Technology Officer (CTO) as joint defendants.186 The target company’s CEO
and CTO were named defendants because they participated in soliciting the
de-SPAC transaction’s proxies and consent materials.187
The relevant facts are that the target company had, through the CEO and
CTO, misrepresented to investors its financial projections and other material
facts.188 The CEO represented that Ability owned proprietary technology unavailable to its competitors, and that Ability had over $65 million in backlogged revenue evidenced by signed purchase orders.189 Ability ultimately
projected to investors that it would generate up to $110 million in revenue in
2016.190
Based on the target company’s projections, the SPAC and Ability entered into a merger agreement signed by the CEO and CTO.191 The agreement
expressly permitted using the CEO and CTO’s names for solicitation of proxies and consents.192 The merger agreement also stipulated that Ability and the
SPAC would be jointly responsible for preparing proxy materials, and required Ability’s representations to be true and correct at the time of the agreement.193
After signing the merger agreement, the SPAC conducted due diligence
toward the target company by hiring two auditing agencies.194 One of the
agencies returned a report consistent with Ability’s revenue predictions.195
However, the other auditing agency reported that signed purchase orders supported only about a third of the backlogged revenue, that most of the orders
were from a single client, and that these two issues “could indicate a significant risk.”196
185. SEC v. Hurgin, 484 F. Supp. 3d 98, 103–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
186. Id. at 104–07.
187. Id. at 105–06 (“Specifically, each signed a form on November 17, 2015, . . . consenting
to the use of his name in the Proxy Statement.” (internal quotations omitted)).
188. Id. at 107.
189. Id. at 104.
190. Hurgin, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 104.
191. Id. at 105.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 106–07.
194. Id. at 105.
195. Id.
196. Hurgin, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 105.

2021]

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

273

The SPAC and Ability included only the auditor’s report that echoed
Ability’s revenue predictions in its investor presentations.197 They omitted the
auditor’s report revealing the purchase order discrepancy and small client
base.198 Even worse, the SPAC and Ability included materials from the CEO’s
presentation regarding projected revenues and proprietary technology ownership.199 After completing the de-SPAC transaction, Ability’s revenue decreased rapidly because its largest client decreased orders and eventually dissipated in 2017.200 In Ability’s 2015 Form 20-F report with the Commission,
it “disclosed publicly for the first time” that it did not own the proprietary
technology but sold it under a reseller agreement.201
After Ability filed the report, the SEC filed a complaint alleging that the
defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 14a9, to which the defendants responded by filing motions to dismiss the
claims.202 The court pointed out in reviewing the motions to dismiss that scienter is required to establish claims under Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Section 17(a)(1); but that scienter is not required to establish claims under Sections 17(a)(2)–(3), Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, or Rule 14a-9.203 Additionally, while the provisions requiring scienter demand a showing of “reckless disregard for the truth,”204 Sections 17(a)(2)-(3) only require “a ‘showing
of negligence.’”205
The SEC alleged that the defendant CEO’s claim of Ability’s exclusive
in-house ownership of proprietary technology was untrue. 206 The defendants
were only resellers of the technology for three years under an undisclosed
reseller agreement with the true owner.207 The SEC also alleged that the target
company had based its financial growth projections on a sales pipeline that
the defendants had fraudulently stated was backed by signed purchase orders.208 Finally, the SEC claimed that the defendants had wrongfully omitted
from the proxy filing the report of an auditing agency that uncovered a lack
of signed purchase orders, but had included another auditor’s report that was
favorable.209
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Hurgin, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 107–08.
Id. at 109.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (quoting SEC v. Ginder, 752 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 2014)).
Id. at 107.
Id.
Hurgin, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 107.
Id.
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The defendants argued that the misstatements were immaterial and that
some of the statements were not actionable under the bespeaks caution doctrine.210 The bespeaks caution doctrine states that “forward-looking statements are not actionable if the speaker discloses the contingency that lies at
the heart of the alleged misrepresentation.”211 The defendant CEO’s arguments that the statements were immaterial did not persuade the court at this
initial stage of the pleadings.212 In response to the defendant’s use of the bespeaks caution doctrine, the court pointed out that the doctrine does not apply
to situations where the potential problems disclosed have already materialized.213 In this case, the potential problems of a thin client base and unsigned
purchase orders already existed and could not be mitigated by a disclaimer
that they might arise.214
The court ultimately concluded that the SEC had pled sufficient facts to
survive a motion to dismiss.215 Also, the court noted that although the SEC
might have failed to plead sufficient facts to prove scienter, scienter is best
determined by a finder of fact, and it is not usually “appropriate for a district
court to decide questions of scienter as a matter of law.”216
Securities laws offer a more comprehensive remedy for any negligence
or fraud on the part of SPAC directors and officers. The following subsection
will explain why SPAC litigation should be heard in federal court to enhance
judicial economy and overall fairness, by using securities laws instead of the
laws of corporate fiduciary duties to help plaintiffs recover. The second subsection will explain why directors and officers of target companies are often
more liable for any misrepresentation of material facts than the directors and
officers of SPACs.
1.

SPAC Litigation Should be Heard in Federal Court to Enhance
Judicial Economy and Enhance Plaintiffs’ Likelihood of Recovery

SPAC litigation such as Hurgin and Lobell should be brought in federal
court because the federal courts are better equipped to decide issues that turn
upon federal securities law.217 Litigating in federal court under the securities
laws rather than Delaware laws of corporate fiduciary duty is good for
210. Id. at 111.
211. Id. at 111 (internal quotations omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 111–12.
214. Hurgin, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 112.
215. Id. at 113.
216. Id.
217. See NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 24–25 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that plaintiffs can bring cases of common law fraud in state courts for fraud surrounding
securities filings, but that if plaintiffs want to seek damages based on the federal securities laws
those claims must be brought in federal court).
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plaintiffs and judicial economy because a plaintiff’s suit is less likely to be
dismissed.218 For instance, at the 2019 ACE Legal Panel discussing securities
litigation, the moderator asked Jeremy Lieberman of Pomerantz why the Federal courts have approximately 400 securities cases filed each year instead of
the 200 or so cases that were being filed in years prior.219 Lieberman stated in
response that the obvious factor was “the Delaware courts became much more
. . . restrictive when it came to . . . merger cases . . . so a number of those cases
fled Delaware and now come to federal courts . . . throughout the country.”220
Securities laws are better for plaintiffs’ SPAC litigation because their
cases are less likely to be dismissed than if brought under Delaware laws of
corporate fiduciary duties.221 The pleading requirements when seeking recovery under securities laws are less burdensome than the pleading requirements
for breach of corporate fiduciary duty. For several of the securities statutes,
the plaintiff need only prove negligence instead of a “reckless disregard for
the truth” on the directors’ part, as shown by the court’s analysis in Hurgin.222
The court specifically cited Section 14(a) as potentially imposing a duty on
any party that consents to using his name in Proxy Statements.223 While the
analysis in Hurgin regarding rule 14(a) does not guarantee that plaintiffs can
hold target companies and their directors and officers liable for fraud or material misrepresentation of its financials, it shows plaintiffs can recover from
a target company under the securities laws.224 Because plaintiffs are less likely
to have their suits dismissed in the federal courts, and because plaintiffs have
a lower bar to meet in pleading, the securities laws provide plaintiffs with a
better path to recovery.
2.

Why Directors of Target Companies Must be Held Liable for Material
Misrepresentation

It is noteworthy that the Hurgin target company’s directors were held
liable for violations of proxy solicitations filed before the de-SPAC transaction.225 The court’s opinion is interesting because, before the de-SPAC
218. See NCPERS, ACE19: Legal Panel: Securities Litigation, YOUTUBE (July 25, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nq1mFLlAkrs&t=1511s.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. SEC v. Hurgin, 484 F. Supp. 3d 98, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); see also supra Part IV
(contrasting Lobell and Hurgin—in Lobell the plaintiff had to show gross negligence or reckless disregard for the truth to overcome the business judgment rule, whereas in Hurgin the
plaintiff simply had to show simple negligence).
223. Hurgin, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 117 (“Section 14(a) imposes such a duty on anyone who
consents to the use of his name to solicit proxies.”).
224. See id.
225. Id. at 104.
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transaction, a SPAC does not require the target company’s directors to be involved in the SPAC’s proxy and solicitation process.226 However, the court
held that the target company’s directors were involved and reachable for several reasons.227 Namely, the directors signed and consented to using their
names in the SPAC’s proxy filings in the merger agreement.228 The target
company’s CEO also delivered a misleading keynote lecture while aiding the
SPAC directors in soliciting investors before closing the de-SPAC transaction.229
The court took time to explain why the target company’s directors should
be held liable for actions taken before the de-SPAC transaction.230 United
States securities laws hold directors and officers of operating companies liable for fraudulently manipulating their proxy statements and reports to shareholders for financial gain.231 A target company can similarly exploit shareholders by misrepresenting its finances to a SPAC with reports filed in the
SPAC’s proxy statement. The SPAC’s subsequent reliance on the target company’s information is not the primary problem; instead, the problem is the
target company’s misrepresentation of its value to the SPAC. Additionally,
since SPACs are shell companies with little to no operating figures to report,
it is unlikely that a SPAC would inaccurately state its financial information in
a proxy statement.
The target company’s directors and officers have an apparent motive to
report false financial information, making them the most likely source of inaccurate information. Courts should seek to hold directors and officers of target companies liable for misrepresenting material facts to SPAC directors and
officers. However, when SPAC directors and officers work with the target
company’s directors and officers to mislead the SPAC’s shareholders, both
should be held liable. Still, when SPAC directors and officers have completed
due diligence, and securities fraud is perpetrated solely by the target company,
only the target company should be held liable for the fraud.
In sum, directors and officers of target companies have a motive to report
false or misleading financial statements to increase the perceived values of
their companies. SPAC directors and officers should not be held liable when
after reasonable due diligence they fail to discover that a target company’s
financial statements are misleading. Instead, SPAC directors and officers
should include the directors and officers of the target company in proxy filings
if possible. In the alternative, courts should recognize that SPAC directors and

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 117.
Id. at 117–18.
Id.
Hurgin, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 106–07, 113.
Id. at 117–18.
See id. at 107–09.
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officers should be afforded the due diligence defense as liberally as it is afforded to underwriters in traditional IPOs.
V.

MAKING SPAC DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY MORE CLOSELY MATCH
THAT OF IPO UNDERWRITERS

Part V will show why SPAC directors’ and officers’ liability should be
limited to match that of IPO underwriters. Part V.A will explain why SPAC
directors and officers should be entitled to a due diligence defense as are underwriters in traditional IPOs. Part V.B will show that the lack of precedent
for applying the business judgment rule to SPAC mergers does not justify
courts’ blind reliance on the precedent established in cases regarding traditional mergers.
A.

Why the Due Diligence Defense Should Apply More Liberally to SPAC
Directors and Officers than to the Directors and Officers of Operating
Companies

Section 11 of the Securities Act holds parties that “play a direct role in a
registered offering” liable for failure to fully and fairly disclose material information regarding the offering and the issuer under Section 5.232 Generally,
any party can assert a due diligence defense except an issuer.233 The law can
afford the due diligence defense to inside directors if they can show that they
were not the issuer as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 77b234 and met the due diligence
requirements set forth by 15 U.S.C. § 77k.235 Directors and officers of corporations usually face a high standard when asserting a due diligence defense.236
The leading cases hold that inside directors and officers “will be liable in
practically all cases of misrepresentation,” and that “[t]heir liability approaches that of the issuer as guarantor of the accuracy of the prospectus.”237
The due diligence defense operates on a sort of sliding scale, rarely protecting
inside directors, occasionally protecting outside directors and low-level managers, but often protecting underwriters and other third-party players in the

232. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1983); see also William
K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
44 BRANDEIS L.J. 549, 551 (2006).
233. Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 232, at 554.
234. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (2020) (defining “issuer” to mean “every person who issues or
proposes to issue any security . . . .”).
235. 15 U.S.C § 77k(b)(3).
236. See Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 232, at 575–77.
237. Id. at 577 (internal quotations omitted).
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issuing process.238 It is understandable for courts to be stricter on operating
companies’ directors and officers since they have firsthand knowledge of
daily operations. However, it does not make sense to do the same for the inside directors of SPACs because they do not have inside knowledge of the
target company’s operations. Instead, courts should afford SPAC directors
and officers the due diligence defense as liberally as it is afforded to lead
underwriters in traditional IPOs.239 Courts afford lead underwriters the due
diligence defense if they can show that they exercised a “high degree of care
in investigation and independent verification of the company’s representations.”240
Because the due diligence defense is rarely effective for inside directors,
SPACs should mitigate liability where they can. For example, SPAC directors
and officers could use the merger agreement to get a contractual commitment
from the target company that its directors will sign the proxy statement, to
expose the target company’s directors to liability for misstatements in the
SPAC’s proxy filings.241 Ultimately, courts should modify the standard of
pleading the due diligence defense for SPAC directors to match the standard
of pleading afforded to traditional IPO underwriters.
B.

Why the Court Should not Uniformly Apply Precedent Regarding
Traditional Mergers to SPACs

The court in Lobell accurately noted a lack of precedent that speaks specifically to SPAC directors’ and officers’ interests and how courts should
evaluate them.242 The recent uptick in SPAC IPOs and SPAC mergers is sure
to remedy that situation shortly. Still, in the meantime, courts should understand that SPAC mergers are fundamentally different from traditional mergers. First, traditional mergers almost always are between two operating companies, whereas a SPAC is a publicly-traded shell company merging with an
operating target company.243 Second, the SPAC’s stated reason for being is to
acquire a target company within a specified period, and the SPAC’s directors
and officers are not compensated if a de-SPAC transaction does not occur.244
Third, shareholders invest in a SPAC with knowledge of the SPAC’s goal and
238. Id. at 599 (stating that courts are stricter on defendants that are more involved with
the issuing company and less strict on defendants that are not directly involved in the target
company, in a sliding scale approach).
239. Id. at 588–89.
240. Id. at 588.
241. See id. at 558.
242. AP Servs., LLP v. Lobell, No. 651613/12, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2314, at *18–19
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 19, 2015) (stating that the parties failed to supply accurate precedent for
how Delaware’s corporate laws should apply to SPACs).
243. See supra Part II.D.
244. See SPAC Update, supra note 20, at 7.
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compensation structure.245 And fourth, the most likely litigation involving
SPACs will be securities fraud since the SPAC is an empty shell company
seeking to take a private company public.246
Therefore, courts should not immediately apply the entire fairness standard of review to SPACs because the shareholders knowingly joined the investment, and the shareholders can exit if they wish. Based on this knowledge,
courts should dismiss most cases under the business judgment standard of
review and refer cases to the federal courts for litigation under the appropriate
securities laws.
VI.

CONCLUSION

SPACs are increasing in popularity for three primary reasons. First, they
are the only method for many companies to reach the public markets. Second,
they are quicker for private companies than an IPO. And third, they have procedural and structural safeguards that protect investor capital. This Note illustrated how the procedural safeguards afforded SPAC investors eclipse those
afforded to the same investors in a traditional IPO. The Note then explained
how one of the structural safeguards, the corporate fiduciary duties of SPAC
directors and officers, can expose the company to unwarranted litigation if the
company’s stock performs poorly after the de-SPAC transaction. While many
corporations’ directors appropriately have been held to this standard to reduce
the likelihood of solitary investors’ being unjustifiably forced into a merger,
the SPAC’s procedural safeguards afford all its investors the ability to redeem
shares before the de-SPAC transaction. It is inequitable to allow the investor
that approved the de-SPAC transaction and consciously chose to remain an
investor to later sue the directors and officers if the company’s stock should
perform poorly after the de-SPAC transaction.
Furthermore, if directors and officers should mislead investors by failing
to disclose the target company’s financial status adequately, investors are not
left without a remedy. They have the same protections afforded to all shareholders by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Since the investors of SPACs
already receive enhanced safeguards compared to traditional IPOs, courts
should amend the duties of SPAC directors and officers and the defenses afforded to them to match the responsibilities of IPO underwriters and issuers.
Ultimately, this approach would promote judicial economy and overall fairness while also protecting companies that go public with SPACs from frivolous lawsuits brought by disappointed investors who seek merely to recover
capital after a deal they approved goes south.
245. See supra Part III.A.
246. See supra Part III.C.
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